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n my most recent column, I ex­
pressed concern about the effec­
tiveness of the constitutional deci­
sion rules that currently govern ger­
rymandering - the redrawing of elec­
toral districts in a manner that favors 
the incumbent majority at the ex­
pense of those out of power. 
Briefly, the Constitution has not 
been interpreted to prohibit redis­
tricting with an eye toward advancing 
the interests of the political party in 
power. But it has been interpreted to 
bar legislators from redistricting on 
racial grounds - at least in most cir­
cumstances. 
The problem is that voters from 
certain racial groups tend to vote 
overwhehningly for a single party. 
Thus, one way to gain partisan advan­
tage in racially diverse states is to di­
lute the voting power of racial groups 
who tend to vote for the other party. 
This is accomplished by either "pack­
ing" voters from these groups into 
districts the other party is going to 
win anyway, or "cracking" them into a 
number of different legislative dis­
tricts so that they fall somewhat short 
of a majority in each one. 
As matters now stand, redistrict­
ing that results in such packing and 
cracking is constitutional if a court 
finds that its "predominant purpose" 
was merely to secure partisan advan­
tage. But it is unconstitutional ifa 
court finds that racial motivations 
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predominated. 
As a consequence, if the 
law remains as it is, we can 
expect that state legislatures 
will simply engage in a form of 
kabuki theater when they re­
district. They will fill the leg­
islative record with refer­
ences to their naked partisan 
goals - and scrub it of refer­
ences to race - in order to per­
suade the courts to find that 
politics, and not race, predom­
inated in their decision-mak­
ing. 
On the ground, little will 
change - at least so long as 
voters do not punish legisla­
tors who engage in partisan 
gerrymandering. 
This is why so many ob­
servers are closely watching 
the progress of Gill v. Whit­
ford, a case from Wisconsin 
that the Supreme Court may 
decide to take up as early as 
this week. Gill presents the 
court with an opportunity to 
hold that the Constitution 
places limits on partisan ger­
rymandering even where a 
racial motivation is not shown. 
Gill arose from a constitu­
tional challenge to partisan 
gerrymandering carried out 
by the Republican-controlled 
Wisconsin state legislature in 
2011, following the 2010 na­
tional census. (State legisla­
tures redistrict every 10 years 
to account for population 
changes recorded in the most 
recent census.) 
As a result of this gerry­
mandering, in 2012, Republi­
cans won 60 out of 99 seats in 
Wisconsin's general assembly 
even though they secured 
only 48.6 percent of the 
statewide vote. And in 2014, 
they won 63 out of 99 seats 
with a mere 52 percent of the 
statewide vote. 
Democratic voters sued 
and claimed that the legisla­
ture's action violated their 
First Amendment associa­
tional rights and 14th Amend­
ment equal protection rights. 
By a 2-1 vote, a federal trial 
court agreed and upheld their 
claims. (There are special 
procedural provisions, includ­
ing one for a three-judge trial 
court, that are used in elec­
tion law cases of this sort.) In 
a subsequent order, the court 
directed the Wisconsin legis­
lature to redistrict in a less 
partisan manner. 
What makes the case po­
tentially so important is that 
the court found both that 
there are judicially manage­
able decision rules under 
which the plaintiffs' claims 
may be adjudicated, and that 
the Wisconsin legislature's 
conduct was unconstitutional 
under those rules. 
Specifically, the court ac­
cepted and applied an innova­
tive mathematical formula 
proposed by the plaintiffs that 
measures whether candidates 
for the winning party received 
a disproportionately smaller 
number of "wasted votes" ­
the extra votes for winning 
candidates that were not 
needed to win, and all votes 
cast for losing candidates ­
than candidates for the losing 
party. And the court then held 
that the gap between the 
large number of wasted votes 
cast for Democrats, and the 
relatively small number of 
wasted votes cast for Republi­
cans, was unconstitutionally 
large. 
In the past, a number of 
Supreme Court justices have 
expressed doubt that partisan 
gerrymandering is consistent 
with the First and 14th 
Amendments. But a majority 
of the court has never been 
able to agree on a standard 
that marks an appropriate 
constitutional boundary. For 
this reason, several other jus­
tices have opined that no such 
standard exists, and that 
claims of unconstitutional par­
tisan gerrymandering are not 
susceptible to judicial review. 
If the court decides to re­
view the Wisconsin ruling on 
its merits, the justices will 
probably divide into at least 
two camps. The court's more 
conservative justices will 
likely remain unpersuaded 
that partisan gerrymandering 
claims are a proper subject of 
judicial review. But its more 
liberal justices will likely be 
more inclined to see the case 
as justiciable, and may well be 
receptive to the approach 
taken by the lower court. 
As has so often been the 
case in recent years, it may all 
come down to Justice An­
thony Kennedy. 
In a 2004 case, Justice 
Kennedyjoined with a conser­
vative plurality in rejecting a 
claim of unconstitutional par­
tisan gerrymandering. But he 
did not agree with the plural­
ity that such claims could 
never be properly adjudi­
cated. Rather, he preferred to 
leave the door open to the 
eventual emergence of judi­
cially manageable decision 
rules to evaluate such claims. 
Will counting and compar­
ing wasted votes - as the WlS­
consin court has done - strike 
Justice Kennedy as an appro­
priate and judicially manage­
able method for operationaliz­
ing constitutional limits on 
partisan gerrymandering? 
Stay tuned. And recognize 
that, if the lower court's deci­
sion in Gill is upheld, the ef­
fect on redistricting after the 
2020 census could be pro­
found 
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